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The problem of skepticism is the paradigmatic 
philosophical problem, because it is the kind of pro-
blem that appears to be elusive of decisive resolution 
and,thus it is the kind of problem that keeps philoso-
phy in business. Of course, every theory of knowledge 
attempts to either refute skepticism, explain why we 
cannot psychologically accept it, or dismiss it as a 
pseudo problem. But after over 2000 years the problem 
is still being discussed, with fresh approaches being 
advanced every other month, from which I conclude that 
no absolutely decisive and compelling solution to the 
problem has been as yet formulated. 
There are, moreover, no clear proponents of skepti-
cism. Even Barry Stroud, the latest champion of taking 
skepticism seriously, says that skepticism n. . . i s 
not something we should seriously consider adopting 
. . . n i So we have a situation in which a particular 
claim—the claim that we should maintain skeptical 
doubts concerning the ontological status of the objects 
of perception--!s neither openly defended nor yet deci-
sively refuted. 
The best explanation of this situation, which most 
adequately and coherently explains both our rejection 
of skepticism and our inability to refute it, is the 
explanation of the skeptical problem offered by Charles 
Peirce. Peirce's approach has the further advantage of 
neither embracing skepticism nor begging the question 
against skepticism. In what follows I will try to 
defend this claim.* 
The Peircean strategy involves two components. The 
first component consists in the assertion that the 
skeptic, say a man, cannot be beat at his own game. 
Thus, this assertion cedes to the skeptic the view that 
there is no solution to the skeptical problem on its 
own terms, in the way that the skeptic sets up the 
problem. To this extent Peirce agrees with the skep-
tic. The second component of the Peircean approach 
parts company with the skeptic, however, in his asser-
tion that, because of the cogency of the skeptical pro-
blem, we can have no knowledge. Peirce can be said to 
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have held that we can have knowledge, but of course to 
say that may be to equivocate on the meaning of the 
word 'knowledge'. However, it should become apparent 
that Peirce's definition of knowledge is not trivial 
nor a mere linguistic ploy to avoid the skeptical 
conclusion. In the following essay I will first offer 
a contentious definition of skepticism and then discuss 
in turn each of the components of Peirce's approach. 
I. The Skeptical Problem 
There are many versions and varieties of epistemo-
logical skepticism, but I will contend that at least 
most (or the more philosophically tenable) share a 
basic skeletal framework based on two claims. The 
first claim is the Pyrrhonian Principle, which states 
that if the evidence for and against a given proposi-
tion is equal, then we should suspend judgement with 
respect to that proposition. The second claim is that, 
in fact, the evidence for and against the possibility 
of knowledge about anything other than the content of 
our own subjective experiences is equal.' From these 
two claims follows deductively the skeptical conclusion 
that we should suspend judgement on the possibility of 
knowledge about anything other than the content of our 
own subjective experiences. The skeptic does not make 
a propositional claim, therefore, either that we can or 
cannot have knowledge of the external world. The skep-
tic simply withholds judgement. The skeptic is there-
fore not a solipsist but more like the agnostic to the 
solipsist's atheism: the latter say "I know that x is 
not the case" whereas the former say "I do not know 
whether x is the case or not." 
The variety of skeptical arguments is produced by 
the variety of ways skeptics cash out the second claim, 
i.e. that the evidence for and against the possibility 
of knowledge about anything other than the content of 
our own subjective experiences is equal. Thus one 
could propose phenomenalism and realism, or realism and 
eyil demons, or evil demons and God, or any combination 
thereof as equally strong theories, and then using the 
Pyrrhonian principle deduce the skeptical conclusion. 
To establish their equality all that needs to be shown 
is that what justifies one theory can be used equally 
well to justify a counter theory. Put another way, we 
might say that two theories are equal when they account 
for our subjective experiences in equally coherent and 
comprehensive ways. Surely such equality has been 
demonstrated. If anything, it seems often the case 
that realism has less explanatory value than some of 
its far-fetched and seemingly implausible rivals, as 
for instance in explaining perceptual mistakes. 
Thus it is this two-pronged skeletal framework of 
the skeptical argument that I will now subject to 
Peirce, rather than any particularities of skepticism 
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such as Descartes'8 veil of ideas or Putnam's brain in a vat. 
II. Where the Skeptic is Right 
A. J. Ayer, although he is partly sympathetic to 
Peirce's philosophy, has summarily dismissed Peirce's 
response to the skeptical dilemma as begging the ques-
tion against it. Ayer says that in promoting the meth-
od of science as the best method for fixing belief and 
ultimately learning the truth about the world, Peirce 
"tacitly assumes that the nature of our experience, and 
so of the world which it reveals to us, is such that it 
cannot withhold its secrets from a scientific ap-
proach. "* 
In my view, however, Ayer's analysis is at least 
partially incorrect. I believe Peirce admitted that 
the skeptical problem cannot be solved on the skeptic's 
terms. To the extent this is true, Ayer is wrong to 
say simply that Peirce begged the question against 
skepticism: the matter is at least more complex than 
that. 
In his early essay, "The Fixation of Belief," Peirce states: 
If investigation cannot be regarded as proving 
that there are Real things, it at least does not 
lead to a contrary conclusion.* 
Here Peirce is referring to scientific investigation, 
which was the only method of inquiry that he considered 
reliable or useful. Thus Peirce admits that science 
cannot prove or disprove realism or externality, and 
that evidence cannot therefore be provided against 
skepticism. To see more clearly why this is so we need 
to discuss Peirce's concept of doubt. 
¥eirce held some very strong views on the nature of 
doubt. Doubt plays a key role in Peirce's epistemology 
because Peirce considers doubt to be the source of, and 
impetus for, all inquiry.' Doubt is the opposite of 
belief, and for Peirce "the essence of belief is the 
establishment of a habit,"7 and "our beliefs guide our 
desires and shape our actions."* Belief, for Peirce, 
is a state of mind, a felt quality or experience :that can guide action. Doubt, as the absence of belief, is 
likewise a felt quality or experience, but it is the 
inability to act. Whereas belief is a calm and satis-
fied state, doubt is a feeling of uneasiness and anx-
iety, for one does not know what to do.* 
For Peirce, doubt always arises from practice. 
Since beliefs are tied to, and even defined by, the ac-
tions they generate, doubt or the absence of belief 
arises in the course of acting, specifically when act-
ing comes to a halt.1' Doubt arises when, for example, 
we are driving along in our car and come to an unfamil-
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iar intersection, and do not know how to proceed in or-
der to arrive at our destination. Peirce admits that 
we may feign doubt, as when we are driving along and 
wonder where the side-roads lead to, and we may even 
let this idle wondering motivate us to inquiry. 1 1 But 
the points he emphasizes are (1) that doubt is neces-
sarily tied to an activity that has been interfered 
with because of an absence of belief, and (2) that 
doubt motivates all inquiry. Thus in response to doubt 
we seek the means to establish the beliefs we need to 
continue our activity. 
Mow this understanding of doubt must necessarily 
bracket out skeptical doubts. When Peirce says "nobody 
therefore can really doubt that there are Reals," 1 8 he 
means that such a doubt would simply not be the sort of 
doubt he defines as "real" doubt. I think it is less 
dogmatic for our purposes if we simply say that the 
skeptical doubt is different from Peirce's conception 
of doubt, and avoid evaluative hierarchies of "real" 
doubt and "unreal" doubt at this point. 
Why is it that skeptical doubts cannot be included 
in Peirce'8 definition of doubt? It is because skepti-
cal doubts do not halt practical activity and, because 
of this, cannot be resolved. To resolve the anxiety we 
feel at the unfamiliar intersection there are any num-
ber of things we can do: we can ask someone where we 
are and how to get to our destination; we can get the 
map out of the glove compartment; we can retrace our 
steps to familiar landmarks; or we can just pick any 
turn and continue on, hoping to eventually find our 
way. There is no such procedure to resolve the skepti-
cal doubt, because any such action we take or evidence 
we offer would be equally subject to the skeptical 
doubt. Any of the ordinary sorts of evidence we might 
offer in defense of the claim that our perceptual ex-
perience really does indicate the way the world is 
would be subject to the alternative explanations the 
skeptic offers—the evil demon, scientists keeping our 
brain in a vat, etc.—and there just would be no evi-
dence that the skeptic could not challenge. This is 
because the skeptical doubt does not arise from prac-
tice; it is not the case that we believe in externality 
until we come to an unfamiliar place from which we do 
not know how to proceed. What is the purposeful activ-
ity obstructed by skeptical doubt? There really is 
none, and so inquiry motivated by skeptical doubts has 
no clear direction, no end-point of activity it is 
trying to achieve or justify. Skepticism does not 
arise out of activity nor is its resolution motivated 
by a felt need for guidance in our actions. The skep-
tic says all our actions are entirely consistent with 
any number of alternative metaphysical explanations, 
and it is precisely this equal consistency that gives 
the skeptical problem its force as a dilemma. There 
just is nothing we can offer to refute the possibility 
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of alternative explanations of experience. This is why 
skepticism has never been refuted. If skepticism were 
tied to our activity in any way, then its force would 
be diminished and there would be a procedure for its 
resolution. The skeptic realizes that by disassociat-
ing his skeptical doubt from any experiential consider-
ations or effects his argument is truly irrefutable. 
It is this disasBociation from activity that leads 
Peirce to opine that the skeptical doubt can "not be a 
source of dissatisfaction" and therefore is not a real 
doubt.1' We can have no felt experience of anxiety or 
uneasiness in regard to a skeptical doubt because it 
cannot affect our activities in any way. Stanley 
Cavell has argued that this assumption is unfair. 
Cavell wants to say that the skeptical doubt can be a 
felt experience, and by implication therefore Peirce 
must be wrong to dismiss skeptical doubts as not 
genuine. 1 4 I think that'Cavell may indeed have a valid 
point but that this point does not repudiate Peirce's 
overall thesis. Let me explain. 
It is not inconceivable that a person who believes 
that some significantly divergent alternative explana-
tions of their perceptual experiences are equally poss-
ible might feel some anxiety or uneasiness. Thus 
Cavell's point is well taken: the skeptic may experi-
ence the skeptical doubt as a felt quality, and there-
fore the skeptical doubt cannot be casually dismissed 
by Peirce as not genuine. However, a distinction still 
needs to be made between the skeptical doubt and the 
other sorts of doubt Peirce discusses. We cannot re-
solve the skeptic's doubt any more than we can resolve 
a doubt over whether the earth was created five minutes 
ago just as it is now. Moreover, we cannot even fathom 
what the procedure would look like by which we could 
come to resolve such doubts. These facts must mark off 
such doubts as skeptical doubts and whether the earth 
was created five minutes ago from doubts such as 
whether we should turn right or left to get to 
Pawtucket Avenue or even whether there are any living 
creatures in the next galaxy over. For even though we 
may never have the means to resolve the latter doubt, 
we can spell out the basic procedure necessary for it 
to be resolved. Thus, Peirce can admit that Cavell is 
right to say that skeptical doubts are a type of doubt, 
but still hold to a distinction between doubts that are 
not resolvable in principle and doubts that are resol-
vable in principle. 
Making a distinction between these kinds of doubt 
has the advantage of clarifying why it is that skepti-
cism cannot be refuted. It is not a doubt of the sec-
ond type and is therefore not resolvable in principle. 
Now notice that classifying the skeptical problem in 
this way is not to say that it is a pseudo problem and 
notj genuine, something which I do not think Peirce 
believed. Skepticism is a genuine problem in that it 
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asks for evidence that we cannot provide- It is be-
cause we cannot provide this evidence that Peirce re-
jected the correspondence theory of justification and 
moved to fallibilism. Because Peirce admits that sci-
ence cannot prove "that there are Real things"1* he 
cannot use correspondence as a criterion for knowl-
edge, 1 C and says that the object of inquiry can only be 
the settlement of belief. 1 7 Peirce does not argue, as 
some philosophers have, that the problem of skepticism 
is entirely vacuous or that the terms in which the 
skeptical problem is posed have no meaning. 
So it appears that, even though Peirce wanted to 
say no one can "really doubt" the existence of Reals, 
we cannot conclude from this that Peirce dismissed 
skepticism as a pseudo problem or believed that he 
could refute it. Peirce ceded to the skeptics their 
position that the skeptical dilemma is a real problem 
in that it cannot be facilely dismissed or refuted. 
Peirce recognized that, if we accept the skeptical pro-
blem on the terms that the skeptic lays out, there is 
no way to refute it. We cannot even imagine what pro-
cedure to follow to resolve the skeptic's doubt.1* 
In the following section I would like to discuss what Peirce did not cede to the skeptics, i.e. the view that because of the skeptical problem we must suspend all judgement. 
III. Where the Skeptic is Wrong 
Leaving aside the skeptical argument for the mo-
ment, I will discuss Peirce's reasons for believing we 
are justified in asserting the possibility of knowledge 
beyond our subjective experiences. These reasons con-
stitute Peirce's alternative to skepticism, and both 
explain and justify our actual assertion of the possi-
bility of knowledge, without providing an argument 
which refutes skepticism. 
First we must discuss Peirce's understanding of 
knowledge. What Peirce calls knowledge is justified 
belief, and truth is not distinct from justified 
belief. That is, Peirce claims at one and the same 
time that truth is logically distinct and practically 
indistinct from belief: although believing x does not 
make it true we have no means of ascertaining truth 
above and beyond our method of justifying belief. 
Therefore, the concept of justified true belief con-
tains a redundancy. " Knowledge can simply be defined 
as justified belief, always uncertain and revisable in 
the light of future experience. This is clearly a 
different conception of knowledge than the skeptics 
held. 
Exploration of Peirce's theory should not stop 
here, else it might appear that Peirce easily slips out 
of the skeptic'8 grasp by a simple linguistic tactic-
redefining knowledge so that we can say we have 
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knowledge even though we cannot have the kind of 
knowledge the skeptic wants. Actually, Peirce's view 
is much more interesting than that. 
For Peirce the concepts of belief and doubt, and 
consequently knowledge given Peirce's equation between 
knowledge and justified belief, are inextricably tied 
to practical activity. This is not because justified 
belief is useful belief but rather because belief is a 
cause of activity and so "different beliefs are dis-
tinguished by the different modes of action to which 
they give rise." 2 0 We come to have doubts and are led 
to inquire because we need a guide to action; we need 
to know which turn to take to reach our destination or 
purpose, which for Peirce is never belief alone but al-
ways an activity. 
This view must not be mistaken for the view that 
all scientific activity is practical in the sense of 
having a specific practical purpose as a goal of any 
experiment or inquiry. Peirce adamantly opposed this 
view, and went so far as to say that such researchers 
as business employs to solve some practical problem "do 
not rank as genuine scientific men." 2 1 For Peirce, the 
scientific attitude is exemplified by its disinterest 
in practical affairs and its pursuit of knowledge for 
its own sake. 2 2 Thus, in relating belief and doubt to 
actions and effects Peirce is not making practical 
goals the motive force or standard of science. Rather, 
he is simply arguing that belief and doubt cannot be 
entirely disassociated from their observable, verifia-
ble results. Peirce's pragmatic maxim goes as follows: 
Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.21 
To the extent that the object of our conception is a proposition which entails no effects, our conception of it is therefore problematic. 
None of this so far, however, tells us how belief is justified. We have already stated that Peirce be-lieves the method of science is the best method of jus-tifying belief, but why is this so unless we can prove that science gives us a picture of reality that Corres-ponds to the real thing?. 
It is clear that Peirce believed that science does 
give us a correct picture of reality,2* although the 
current picture is not wholly correct.25 Here is where 
Ayer says Peirce begs the question against the skeptic 
by making a very big assumption and, within narrow lim-
its, I think Ayer is right. But there are some good 
reasons Peirce gives for relying on science, one of 
which I will discuss. Peirce argues that science is 
the best method for settling opinion. In order to un-
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derstand this claim we need to see why Peirce thinks 
science is the best method and what epistemic signifi-
cance the mere settling of opinion has, since even a 
consensus of opinions may, of course, be erroneous. 
Science is the best method for settling opinion 
because it yields more intersubjective conclusions than 
any other. All other methods involve greater degrees 
of human subjectivity. Peirce discusses tenacity 
(holding onto an opinion until it becomes entrenched), 
authority, and the a priori method of justifying be-
lief, and he notes that each of these methods lead too 
often to irremediable differences of opinion. Science, 
which is based on something less open to subjective 
dickering, yields a more permanent and stable belief.2' 
(It is not necessarily begging the question against 
skepticism to assume science's intersubjectivity. Even 
the person who believes she may be a brain in a vat 
must recognize the qualitative distinction between in-
dividual control over one's beliefs based on science 
and over one's beliefs based on the a priori method.) 
To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary 
that a method should be found by which our 
beliefs may be determined by . . . something upon 
which our [individual] thinking has no effect. 2 7 
Thus science yields intersubjective conclusions and 
therefore settles opinions better than any other 
method. All we need to argue in defense of this view 
is not that science tells us the way the world is but 
that we have less conscious control over the outcome of 
scientific inquiry than we have over inquiry based on 
any other method, and surely this is the case. There-
fore, the method of science is the best method to use 
for settling opinion. 
But why should we be concerned with settling opin-
ion? It is because to hold a belief which is not 
shared by others or which does not represent a consen-
sus of opinion within one's sphere of acquaintances is 
to invite doubt, and hence to invite that feeling of 
uneasiness which is entailed by doubt and is the obsta-
cle to habit." 
Unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall neces-
sarily influence each other's opinions, so that 
the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the 
individual merely, but in the community.2' 
The presence of beliefs contrary to our own inclines us 
to question and doubt our own beliefs. Therefore, if 
we wish to have a stable belief to guide our actions 
and dispel that feeling of anxiety and uneasiness that 
doubt brings with it, our goal should be to reach set-
tled opinions with as high a degree of consensus as 
possible. Science, because of its reliance on inter-
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subjective experience and its demand for repeated 
testability, is the best method for achieving a consen-
sus of opinion. Moreover, the method of science also 
involves accounting for a wider scope of opinions and 
experience than any other method,'9 and so is for this 
reason also less likely to allow conflicting opinions 
and the consequent emergence of doubt. Thus, science 
is the best method of fixing belief and dispelling 
doubt. 
Now, what is the relevance of science to the asser-
tion of the possibility of knowledge beyond our subjec-
tive experiences? Peirce's argument goes a3 follows: 
(1) All inquiry is motivated by doubt in order to es-
tablish habits of action. (2) The method of science is 
the best method of dispelling doubt and establishing 
habits of action. We have seen this in science's abil-
ity to achieve greater consensus. (3) Science presup-
poses that we can have knowledge about more than the 
content of our subjective experiences.31 Thus what 
Peirce is arguing is that all inquiry, or the pursuit 
of belief, must presuppose knowledge beyond subjective 
experience. Whenever we inquire, we are therefore 
justified in accepting the possibility of such knowl-
edge. . 
Could the skeptic at this point argue that, if in-
quiry necessitates presupposing the possibility of 
knowledge beyond our subjective experiences, then in 
withholding belief as the skeptic advocates we are 
withholding inquiry, and thus are not forced into a 
commitment to the possibility of such knowledge? It 
seems such an argument must fail to the extent inquiry 
entails belief and to the extent we cannot withhold all 
beliefs about such knowledge. It seems clear that all 
actions presuppose belief. If I walk over to a chair 
and sit down I presuppose that my subjective experience 
of a chair-image correlates to the image's ability to 
hold my weight. If I choose to become a hedonist I 
presuppose that certain actions wiil correlate to cer-
tain pleasures. All actions presuppose some beliefs 
that extend beyond my subjective experience, and yet we 
act at every conscious moment. Even suicide is an ac-
tion which presupposes some belief. We cannot not act, 
and to act is to presuppose belief, and to believe is 
to presuppose that we can have knowledge beyond the 
content of our own subjective experiences. Therefore 
we cannot act in a way that is consistent with skepti-
cism. 
This is not a psychological argument on the order 
of Hume's because where Hume relies on the psychologi-
cal characteristics of the human mind, Peirce bases his 
argument on the coherence between belief and action. 
Skepticism is neither a belief nor a doubt, using 
Peirce's definitions. Skepticism is not a belief since 
it is the withholding of belief, and yet it is not a 
doubt in Peirce's sense because it does not halt activ-
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ity. So skepticism neither generates habits of action 
nor does it halt them. Since all actions presuppose 
belief, and since in the pursuit of consistent beliefs 
we must use the method of science, we must presuppose, 
as in fact we all do, that knowledge about more than 
the content of our own subjective experiences is 
possible. For Peirce, this is a justified hypothesis. 
Setting up the argument in this way demonstrates 
that Peirce does not really beg the question against 
the skeptic. Peirce does not assume the skeptic is 
wrong in saying that we have no proof of realism. 
Rather, Peirce argues that we can only adopt skepticism 
at the expense of coherence. In "The Essentials of 
Pragmatism" he says: 
. . . what you cannot in the least help believing 
is not, justly speaking, wrong belief. In other 
words, for you it is the absolute truth. True, 
it is conceivable that what you cannot help 
believing today, you might find you thoroughly 
disbelieve tomorrow. But then there is a certain 
distinction between things you 'cannot' do, 
merely in the sense that nothing stimulates you 
to the great effort and endeavors that would be 
required, and things you cannot do because in 
their own nature they are insusceptible of being 
put into practise.11 
Thus, our belief in the possibility of knowledge is ab-
solutely justified according to the standards Peirce 
thinks are important, i.e. our ability to doubt it in 
such a way that it affects our activity. And our abil-
ity to doubt cannot be subjectively willed but is de-
termined by the nature of the belief in question and 
its relation to our activity; thus there is a form of 
objectivity in Peirce's epistemology. 
Nevertheless, Peirce cedes to the skeptic his con-
tention that we cannot provide a foundational grounding 
for realism which will assuage the skeptical doubt. I 
conclude from Peirce's admission of this fact and his 
subsequent move to a non-foundational epistemology that 
characterizing Peirce's position toward skepticism as 
one of dismissal is a distortion. It seems to me that 
Peirce's epistemology exemplifies precisely what Barry 
Stroud advocates: taking skepticism seriously not in 
its viability as a warranted assertion but in its forc-
ing us to pursue the question of what a philosophical 
theory of knowledge is actually supposed to do and "how 
our familiar everyday knowledge actually works.",* It 
seems fairer, then, to characterize Peirce's position 
on skepticism as arguing not that it is a pseudo prob-
lem or even a pseudo doubt but simply a doubt unresolv-
able in principle and incapable in principle of affect-
ing actions in any way. And as a matter of fact, ex-
cept for some very old rumors about Pyrrho,1* we know 
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of no skeptic who attempted to change his behavior 
because of his skeptical doubts. Peirce concludes from 
this, and his theory of belief and doubt, that we can-
not make the skeptical conclusion, even while we cannot 
refute it. All inquiry presupposes knowledge beyond 
our subjective experiences, and therefore this belief 
is warranted. Thus Peirce provides, not a refutation 
of skepticism, but an alternative to it. 
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